The Weinberg proposal

A scientific consulting firm says that it aids companies in trouble, but critics say that it manufactures uncertainty and undermines science.

Environmental Science & Technology, Paul Thacker
Published February 22, 2006

Tucked away inside the U.S. EPA's docket on PFOA, a chemical manufactured by DuPont, is a 5-page letter written in April 2003 by the Weinberg Group, an international scientific consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. The letter is addressed to DuPont's vice president of special initiatives, Jane Brooks, and lays out a proposal for how the Weinberg Group can help the company deal with a growing regulatory and legal crisis over PFOA (perfluorooctanoic acid). PFOA is a common building block of the perfluorocarbon family of chemicals, which are renowned for their water and stain resistance. PFOA is the compound used to make Teflon and was once used in other products such as Stainmaster and Gore-Tex. The Weinberg proposal Critics say that the tactics detailed in the Weinberg proposal are commonly used by chemical and pharmaceutical companies trying to combat lawsuits and regulations against their products. View the proposal [354KB PDF] "The constant theme which permeates our recommendations on the issues faced by DuPont is that DUPONT MUST SHAPE THE DEBATE AT ALL LEVELS," states the letter (emphasis in original). For 23 years, the letter continues, the Weinberg Group "has helped numerous companies manage issues allegedly related to environmental exposures. Beginning with Agent Orange in 1983, we have successfully guided clients through myriad regulatory, litigation and public relations challenges posed by those whose agenda is to grossly over regulate, extract settlements from, or otherwise damage the chemical manufacturing industry." Although a DuPont spokesperson confirmed that they had hired the Weinberg Group, no evidence exist that they followed through with all the items outlined in the plan. Nevertheless, experts contend that the document provides one of the clearest examples they have seen to illustrate how consulting firms help industries deal with scientific questions about the safety or health consequences of their products. These firms develop legal defense campaigns, ostensibly based on science, to sway juries during trials, to counteract potential regulatory oversight, and to influence the public's view about the health effects of products. Critics such as David Michaels, chair of the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy at George Washington University, charge that these groups "manufacture uncertainty"-a term Michaels coined-in order to prevent or delay regulations and civil lawsuits. The 2003 letter from the Weinberg Group arrived at DuPont as EPA was finishing up a draft risk assessment on the possible health effects of PFOA. The company was also facing a civil-action lawsuit in West Virginia with plaintiffs alleging that they suffered deleterious health effects from PFOA in their drinking water. In 2004 and 2005, JP Morgan Worldwide Securities Services released reports [1MB PDF] for DuPont investors predicting that the company faced potential EPA fines of more than $300 million and a total liability of $150-$800 million. DuPont also faced risks to its fluoropolymers and telomers business, which the report pegged at about $1.23 billion (4% of total sales), with $100 million in after-tax profits, in 2004. In fact, DuPont settled the class-action lawsuit with residents around a manufacturing plant in March 2005 for $107 million. And in December 2005, DuPont agreed to spend $16.5 million to settle allegations that it withheld from EPA the results of a 1981 study that showed PFOA can cross the placental barrier in humans.